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2000.
Reciprocal Influence and the Role of National and EU Actors
Kees Groenendijk / Tineke Strik
/. Introduction: Klaus Earwig and Europe
Klaus Barwig, as father and custodian of the "Hohenheimer Tage zum
Auslanderrecht", always had an open eye for developments outside Ger-
many. He invited participants and speakers from neighbouring countries,
even if they were not German speakers. We both learned a lot about the
German policies and case-law, but also learned to speak (not write) Ger-
man in public in Hohenheim. Klaus stimulated young students and re-
searchers from other European countries to participate in the Network Mi-
grationsrecht, he next generation of immigration law experts he nurtured
from its inception. Klaus also had an early eye for the growing relevance
of EU migration law for the legal practice in Germany and other EU
states. Our contribution reflects the European perspective in the activities
of Klaus: how does the law and practice regarding family reunification i
Germany and the Netherlands influence developments in the other state
since the start of the negotiations on the EU Family Reunification Direc-
tive in 2000?
1. European harmonization and mutual influence
Since the beginning of this century, the European Union has been working
towards common mles on legal migration and a European Common Asy-
lum System. Now, seventeen years later, the process of harmonization has
been strengthened in two ways: first, many asylum directives have been
revised with a view to further harmonization and second, the Court of Jus-
tice has developed case-law which sets clear limits and obligations for
Member States while applying the directives and regulations. The direc-
tive 2003/86 on the right to family reunification, like most other directives
on legal migration, has not been subject o a review process. However, the
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directive, the case law of the CJEU on its interpretation as well as the
guidelines for its application released by the Commission in 2014, may
have contributed to a further convergence of national family reunification
rules in the Member States.1
These types of norm-setting have influenced the national policies mere-
ly by limiting the national discretion. Member States within the margins
allowed by the Family Reunification Directive on purpose or unconscious-
ly influence national political choices of other Member States. This mutual
influence can take place through different channels and at different stages
of the harmonization process. In our contribution, this process of mutual
influence is explored and analysed with regard to Germany and the
Netherlands. One of the sources of this article is the dissertation ofTineke
Strik, concerning the decision making process and the implementation of
the Family Reunification Directive and the Asylum Procedure Directive,
with a focus on the policies and positions of Germany and the Nether-
lands.2 For her study, Strik interviewed policy makers, negotiators and
other actors in Germany, the Netherlands and Bmssels. In this article, we
first investigate the possible channels for this mutual influence. Secondly,
we look for the issues were this mutual influence between the two neigh-
bouring states actually occurred. Thirdly, we try to describe the relevant
processes in more detail in a case study on the German language test and
the Dutch integration test abroad. In the final part, we draw some more
general conclusions.
CJEU, C-540/03 (Parliament against Council); CJEU, C-578/08 (Chakroun);
C-153/14 (K. and A.); C-558/14 (Khachab); Guidelines on the Application of the
Family Reunification Directive, COM (2014) 210, 3 April 2014; Groenendijk et al.,
The Family Reunification Directive in EU Member States: the first year of imple-
mentation, Nijmegen 2007; Odysseus Academic Network, Confonnity checking of
the transposition by Member States of 10 EC directives in the sector of Asylum and
Immigration, Bmssels 2007; Pascouau/Labayle, Conditions for family reunification
under strain, Bmssels 2011. See also the recent EMN comparative report, Family
Reunification for Third Country Nationals in the EU Member States and Norway:
national practices, Bmssels 2017.
Strik, Besluitvorming over asiel- en migratierichtlijnen. De wisselwerking tussen
nationaal en Europees niveau. Den Haag 2011
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II. Channels of influence
1. During the negotiations on the directive
The first stage of mutual influence concerns the negotiation process, dur-
ing which Member States tried to insert their national mles and policy
plans in the Family Reunification Directive. Germany and the Nether-
lands, like other Member States, initially only aimed for the preservation
of their national legislation. The formal aim of harmonisation was consid-
ered as a desirable effect, but not as an independent ambition. In the
course of the negotiations, both states increasingly also aimed at preserv-
ing national sovereignty with a view to shaping their family reunification
policy at their discretion. We identify three reasons for this change of em-
phasis. First, the proposals of other delegations inspired them to instigate
policy changes in their own Member State. Second, the awareness of the
binding character of the directives grew among the delegations, which mo-
tivated them to make several clauses in the directive more permissive. Fi-
nally, the long duration of the negotiations led to new political plans and
aspirations arising at home, as a result of changes of government or new
national debates and plans. In the Netherlands, the right-wing coalition
Balkenende I (CDA, VVD, LPF) announced restrictive measures on fami-
ly reunification in its coalition agreement of 2002, which forced the Dutch
delegation in Bmssels to change its position and to bring in new proposals
at a relatively late stage of the negotiations. In Germany, the report of the
Zuwandemngskommission presented in July 2001 as well as the legis-
lative proposal for the Zuwandemngsgesetz submitted by the government
to the Bundestag in November 2001, made the German delegation even
more reluctant to agree on any issue out of fear of reducing the room the
discretion of the national legislator.3
As legal safeguards for asylum seekers or migrants create obligations
for Member States and thus limit heir sovereignty, Germany and Nether-
lands like most other Member States aimed at lowering the proposed level
of protection and the room to adapt heir legislation to a minimum level.
3 Zuwandemng estalten, Integration fordem, Bericht der Unabhangigen Kommissi-
on ,Zuwandemng', Berlin 2001; Entwurfeines Gesetzes zur Steuemng und Begren-
zung der Zuwandemng und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von
Unionsburgem und Auslandem (Zuwandemngsgesetz), BT-Drs. 14/7387 und BT-
Drs. 14/7987.
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To this end, they submitted many amendments to the Commission's pro-
posal, frequently proposing to delete provisions, weaken the text from
shall- to may-clauses or to add derogation clauses.4 Most delegations ap-
plied the non-intervention principle, taking a neutral position regarding
proposals from other delegations lowering the standards or widening na-
tional discretion. The negotiation table thus transformed into a 'market of
optional provisions', where delegations mutually supported each other's
proposals.
Both Germany and the Netherlands were successful in getting their pro-
posed amendments accepted, although they used different strategies.5 The
German delegation benefitted from its negotiation weight at all negotiation
levels, from the working group, to the ministerial level, using a lot of
speaking time and displaying in the eyes of other delegations a rather surly
and intimidating attitude. The delegation blocked the negotiations and was
unreceptive to proposals from the Commission or the Presidency for more
than a year. Although this often led to an isolated position, the political
weight of Germany finally resulted in acceptance of its objections and pro-
posals. The German delegation could afford to persevere in its resistance
until their text proposal was accepted in full. This was important to Ger-
many, because it needed the certainty that he national mles of the Zuwan-
derungsgesetz under preparation would fit within the directives in order to
convince governments of the Ldnder, which were co-responsible for the
implementation f that legislation.
The Dutch delegation realised it had to compensate its relatively light
political weight in order to be successful. As it was more dependent on the
support of other Member States, the Dutch delegation frequently organ-
ised bilateral consultations and invested in its personal relations with other
negotiators. The Dutch negotiators also bolstered their opportunities to in-
fluence the directives by acting as an expert or a mediator, or by making
the German delegation present or defend a proposal. The Dutch had to
content hemselves with compromises more often than the German delega-
tion, but found a solution by interpreting the formulation in a way that did
4 Hauschild, Neues europaisches Einwandemngsrecht: Das Recht auf Familienzu-
sammenfitihrung, ZAR 2003, 266-273. For an analysis of all factors determining the
negotiations result, see Strik, Besluitvorming over asiel- en migratierichtlijnen. De
wisselwerking tussen nationaal en Europees niveau. Chapter 9.
5 See also Walter, Familienzusammenflihmng inEuropa, Baden-Baden 2009.
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not require adaptation of its national egislation.6 It accordingly accepted
the risk that this interpretation would be overruled by a Dutch court or the
CJEU at a later stage.
The strategy of mutual support by the national delegations for restric-
tive amendments resulted in a more permissive character of the directives.
A number of precise requirements were replaced by optional provisions,
including references to the national system or international obligations or
by the obligation to make national mles on certain issues.7 The Family Re-
unification Directive furthermore includes a number of derogation clauses
and many vague and open formulations, leaving Member States room for
interpretation. A number of issues were deleted from the directives and
some provisions were transposed to the preamble. As a result of these ac-
tive interventions by Member States, the Family Reunification Directive
now mirrors many elements of national egislation, which Member States
are allowed or even obliged to apply. In this way, the Europeanisation pro-
cess led to a mutual influence of the national legislation on family reunifi-
cation, even though the origin of the clauses may not always be clear.
However, the directive ssentially reflects the national legislation ofnorth-
em Member States: the southern Member States were relatively passive in
their involvement as their legislation on migration was not yet that de-
veloped or detailed, and the eastern Member States did not take part in the
negotiations, which took place before their accession date.
Apart from this more indirect influence, the process of Europeanisation
offered Germany and the Netherlands many avenues to become mutually
inspired by their national policies. During the negotiation process, the na-
tional delegations met and exchanged views and information. While trying
to get support for their amendments, they explained why they had or want-
ed this policy and how it worked or would work. Especially during the last
stage of the negotiations on the Family Reunification Directive, Germany
and the Netherlands howed mutual interest in their policies, as they both
6 Groenendijk/Minderhoud, De Nederiandse invloed op nieuwe Europese regels be-
treffende migratie n asiel, in: Asbeek Brusse et al., Immigratie n asiel in Europa.
Een lange weg naar gemeenschappelijkheid?, p. 137-161.
7 Bruycker, Le niveau d'harmonisation legisative de la politique europeenne d'immi-
gration et d'asyle, in: Julien-Laferriere/Labayle/Edstrom (eds.). The European Im-
migration and Asylum Policy: Critical Assessment Five Years After the Amsterdam
Treaty, p. 54-76.
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looked for ways to make the national family reunification rules more re-
stnctive.
2. After adoption of the directive
After adoption, Member States used the transposition by another state as a
source of inspiration. As the Netherlands partially transposed the Family
Reunification Directive already one year after adoption8, the German gov-
emment made a thorough assessment of the way the Netherlands had im-
plemented the optional clauses of the directive. The Dutch government ac-
tively advocated for the export of their policies, in order to gain support
from other Member States during conformity discussions with the Com-
mission. The German Ministry of Interior was in favour of adopting parts
of the Dutch implementation and used the Dutch legislation as an argu-
ment to overcome the hesitations of the Ministry of Justice about the con-
stitutionality of the proposes implementation. As the Netherlands is a con-
stitutional state, the implementing act should thus be in line with the rule
of law, was the line of reasoning of the Ministry of Interior in Berlin.9
Also after the transposition stage, national civil servants exchanged in-
fomiation on their policies during the so-called contact-committees, con-
vened by the European Commission in Bmssels. The Commission orga-
nized these meetings to promote a harmonized and correct application of
the directive. However, officials at those meetings also gained new ideas
on how to restrict heir family reunification policies. The Dutch govem-
ment in 2010-2012 actively looked for national examples to restrict family
reunification within the limits of the directive, after the Commission had
refused to present a proposal to review the directive. This refusal had
blocked the Dutch aspiration to introduce an education requirement and an
age-limit of 24 years for spouses, both clearly incompatible with Directive
2003/86. During its assessment of other restricting measures such as an
accommodation requirement, the Dutch government closely looked at
German practices as well.10 These types of mutual inspiration also oc-
8 Staatsblad 2004, nr. 496, 12 October 2004.
9 Strik, Besluitvorming over asiel- en migratierichtlijnen. De wisselwerking tussen
nationaal en Europees niveau, p. 163.
10 Kamerstukken 7/2009-2010, 32 175, nr. I; Kamerstukken 7/2011-2012, 32 175,
nr. 32, with attachment.
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curred at the ministerial level, during Council Meetings or bilateral meet-
ings, but also during discussions and exchanges within the European polit-
ical parties.
3. Case law as channel of mutual influence
Another channel, through which national policies of Member State can
mutually influence each other, is the case law on the Family Reunification
Directive, which has led to a clear standard setting by the Court of Justice
on the interpretation f the directive and the way Member States have to
apply its provisions. Through these judgements, which merely follow
from a specific question of interpretation or a conformity issue in one
Member State, policies and legislation of other Member States are affected
as well. This is for instance the case with the Chakroun judgement, where
the Court of Justice made clear that on the basis of the definition of the
term family reunification in the directive, Member States are not allowed
to make a distinction between (the mles for) family formation and family
reunification." With the implementation of the directive, the German leg-
islator had diminished this distinction by reducing the waiting period for
family formation from five to two years, in line with Article 8 of the direc-
tive, with the condition that the residence permit is renewable in view of
the purpose of residence.12 With this implementation, the German legisla-
tor still maintained a different reatment of formation and reunification in
two ways, as for reunification only one year of residence is required and
no additional condition on the prospect of residence applies. Through the
Chakroun case, the difference in treatment between family reunification
and family formation in the Netherlands was subject to a judicial debate
that ended up in Luxemburg. We now know from the answer of the Court
of Justice that the relevant German mles do not comply with the directive,
even though this difference in treatment was not questioned uring or after
the German implementation.
The other element of the Chakroun judgement, he level of the income
requirement, has had an impact on the German legislation as well. Two
years before the CJEU judgment in Chakroun, the Bundesvenvaltungsge-
11 CJEU, C-578/08 (Chah-oun), paragraph 59 and 62. See Article 2 sub d Directive
2003/86 for the definition.
12 See § 30 paragraph 3, sub d AuftenthG.
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richt had decided that only in exceptional, a-typical circumstances, there
could be very weighty reasons to derogate from the income requirement.13
Eight months later the same court confirmed its judgement, considering
that he law does not grant any discretion to the immigration authorities to
derogate from the legal income requirement. It was only up to the national
court to assess if a derogation from the mle was justified, in the light of
Article 6 GG or Article 8 EMRK. 14 The Bundesverwaltungsgericht re-
ferred to the income requirement of Article 7 (1) of the directive, but not
to the obligation of an individual assessment of Article 17. That the Bun-
desverwaltungsgericht, three years after the first CJEU judgement on the
directive, had reduced instead of enlarged the room for an individual as-
sessment, was heavily criticised in Germany.15 The arguments of this criti-
cism were reflected in the Chakroun judgement one year later.16 So even
without a reference from a German court or an infringement procedure
against Germany, the German legislation had to create more discretion for
the individual assessment of whether sufficient income was available, be-
cause the Dutch legislation provoked a referral by a Dutch court and a de-
cision of the CJEU. The referral by the Dutch court was provoked by the
critical remarks on the Dutch income requirement in the 2008 Commis-
sion's report on the application of the directive in Member States.17
4. The directive is binding law after all
These examples illustrate that he Family Reunification Directive also had
its impact on the national policies of the northern Member States, despite
their (perceived) successful negotiations. Transposition studies show that
the directive has both strengthened and weakened the right o family re-
unification, but that the number of liberalisations outweigh the restric-
13 BVerwG, 1 C 32.07, paragraph 27.
14 BVerwG, 1 C 3.08, paragraphs 10-14.
15 Dienelt, BVerwG: Versagung des Ehegattennachzugs bei fehlender Sichemng des
Lebensunterhalts; Dienelt, Das Bundesverwaltungsgericht versagt Familiennach-
zug wegen fehlender Lebensunterhaltssicherung, www.migrationsrecht.net.
16 Dienelt, EuGH legt Anforderungen an die Lebensunterhalssichemng beim Famili-
ennachzug fest- Unvereinbarkeit mit den deutschen Vorgaben im AufenthG,
www.migrationsrecht.net.
17 COM(2008) 610 of 8 October 2008, p. 7, published three months before the refer-
ence in Chakroun.
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tions.18 Especially in Member States where the national rules on family re-
unification were vague, offering broad discretion to the national authori-
ties, the directive led to the codification of the right to family reunification
in national law. This strengthening effect becomes clear in comparison
with Member States who are not bound by the directive: an interdisci-
plinary study on family reunification policies across six EU Member
States shows that the requirements in Denmark, Ireland and the United
Kingdom are clearly exceeding the limits set by the Directive.19 Denmark
requires an age-limit of 24 years for both spouses, an integration assess-
ment for children who travel to their parent(s) residing in Denmark (if
they travel ater than two years after the parent became entitled to family
reunification) and family reunification may be refused if the common ties
of the spouses with another country prevail over their ties with Den-
mark.20 The income requirements in Ireland and the UK are significantly
higher than those in the Member States bound by the directive.21 In the
UK, very high fees for family reunification have to be paid.22 Some gov-
emments bound by the directive envisaged the same policy measures, but
were constrained by the directive. For those countries, the directive meant
that the race to the bottom was stopped by the minimum norms of the di-
rectives.23 Within the limits of the Family Reunification Directive how-
ever. Member States have used their discretion to introduce restrictive
18 Groenendijk et al. The Family Reunification Directive in EU Member States: the
first year of implementation, Nijmegen 2007; Odysseus Academic Network,
"Conformity checking of the ta-ansposition by Member States of 10 EC directives
in the sector of Asylum and Immigration", Brussels 2007; Pascouau/Labayle,
Conditions for family reunification under strain, Bmssels 2011.
19 Strik/de Hart/Nissen, Family Reunification: a barrier or facilitator of integration?
A comparative study", Nijmegen 2013.
20 See for the European case-law on the Danish policies ECtHR of 24 May 2016,
Biao v Denmark, application no. 38590/10 on the compliance with Article 8 and
14 ECHR; CJEU 12 April 2016, Caner Gene v Integrationsministeriet, C-561/14
on the compliance with the standstill clause of Decision o. 1/80, EEC-Turkey As-
sociation Agreement.
21 See the Ireland national report "Family Reunification: a barrier or facilitator of in-
tegration?" by Becker/Cosgrave/Labor, October 2012, and the United Kingdom
national report "Family Reunification requirements: a barrier or facilitator ofinte-
gration?" by Sibley/Fenelon/Mole, Aire Centre, December 2012.
22 Research briefing paper "The financial (minimum income) requirement for partner
visas" by Gower/McGuinness, 22 Febmary 2017, House of Commons Library, no.
06724.
23 Strik 2011, paragraph 10.2.1.
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measures. Their move towards the bottom, de facto leads to a harmonisa-
tion at the level of the minimum standards et by the directive.24
The developing case law on the Family Reunification Directive how-
ever, contributes to a further limitation of the national discretion and the
rise of the minimum standards, as the Court of Justice imposes a strict in-
terpretation of the optional clauses.25 This trend has been fuelled since
lawyers and judges became acquainted with European Migration Law and
its implications, and national courts started submitting requests for a pre-
liminary mling from the Court of Justice. One important implication of
this case law is that the directive not only affects national policymaking,
but also the decision-making by immigration authorities in individual cas-
es. The Union law requirement of conformity with the proportionality
principle requires assessing all individual interests and circumstances in
the light of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the other principles
of Union Law. This implied the abolishment of a standardised ecision-
making system with a more or less automatic rejection in case not all re-
quirements are fully met. Furthermore, since the CJEU case law on the di-
rective, a marginal judicial scmtiny is no longer sufficient: national judges
are required to do a full judicial review and scmtinize the merits and the
facts of a case.26 These effects confirm the assumption of migration
scholars that "policy makers (...) have lost power to the courts".27
Therefore, despite the national reflexes described previously, the norms
of the Family Reunification Directive have undoubtedly strengthened the
legal safeguards for third country nationals who want o reunite with their
family members. The Family Reunification Directive has, unlike art. 8
ECHR, established a right to family reunification. This limits the margin
of appreciation of the Member States while applying the permitted condi-
tions for admission, withdrawal or (non-) renewal. Furthermore, the legal
24 See f.i. Block/Bonjour, Fortress Europe or Europe of Rights? The Europeanisation
of family migration policies in France, Germany and the Netherlands, Eiu-opean
Journal of Migration and Law, 2013, 15 (2) 203-224.
25 CJEU, C-578/08, (Chakroun), paragraph 43.
26 COM(2014)210, paragraph 7.5.
27 Bonjour, The Power and Morals of Policymakers. Reassessing the Control Gap
Debate, in The International Migration Review, 45(1), 2011, 89-122; Bonjour,
Speaking of Rights: The Influence of Law and Courts on the Making of Family
Migration Policies in Germany, Law & Policy, 38 (4), 2016, 328-348; Kawar,
Contesting immigration Policy in Court. Legal activism and its radiating effects in
the United States and France, Cambridge 2015.
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position of admitted family members had not been laid down in such a
concrete manner in other European or international instmments before.
Moreover, with the adoption of the directive, family reunification legisla-
tion has become part of the Union law. As courts interpret he norms with-
in the framework of European Union law, the textual compromises be-
tween national delegations may have a more far-reaching or binding
meaning than the negotiators had in mind.
III. Which issues?
There are several similarities in the transposition of the directive by the
Dutch and German governments. In both countries the legislator strength-
ened the rights to family reunification as a result of the directive and was
restrained from introducing certain restrictions, proposed by right-wing
parties (in the Netherlands) or some Ldnder (in Germany). We will high-
light three issues where the mutual influence of the governments became
clear: the age-limit, he language requirement and the time limit for appli-
cations by refugees.
1. Age-limit
As previously mentioned, the Dutch government had already transposed
the directive in 2004, together with the implementation of certain elements
of the coalition agreement. Two of these elements concerned restrictions
on family formation, namely the rise of the income requirement from 100
to 120 per cent of the national minimum wage and raising the age-limit
from 18 to 21 years. The Dutch government argued that these restrictions
would bring both spouses in a more favourable starting position, and
therefore be beneficial to their integration. As this proposal was part of a
coalition agreement, which was supported by a majority of the parliament,
it was only contested by a few left-wing opposition parties. The criticism
of scholars that the changes were incompatible with the directive was
therefore hardly taken into account.
The officials of the German Ministry of Interior had supported the
Netherlands in creating this possibility in the directive, and as they knew
their minister's preference for restrictions, they proposed to adopt his age-
limit. The ministers of interior of the Lander already advocated the same
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age-limit at their Innenministerkonferenz of 2005. As the Lander were rep-
resented in the German delegation during the negotiations on the directive,
they were well informed about he proposals and policies of other Member
States. CDU Minister of Interior Schauble incorporated this idea in his le-
gislative proposal, with the argument hat the age-limit, combined with a
requirement of knowledge of the German language before admission,
would prevent young migrants from arranged or forced marriages and
would promote their emancipation and integration.28 The age-limit how-
ever was heavily criticized by the Ministry of Justice and by coalition
partner SPD, as it would violate the constitutional right to family life, as
enshrined in Article 6 of the Gennan Constitution. Two experts were
asked for their opinion, but the expert requested by CDU/CSU concluded
that the proposal was constitutional, while the expert requested by the
SPD concluded it was not.29 Finally, in the political compromise between
the two coalition parties, minister Schauble preferred to introduce the lan-
guage requirement, which was equally contested, rather than the age-limit.
The age-limit hat was finally introduced, was therefore set at 18 years,
with a possibility for exemptions in case of hardship.30
2. Language requirement
The introduction of knowledge of the language as a condition for admis-
sion was also based on the Dutch legislation. Germany had supported the
Netherlands in creating room for this requirement in the directive. The
German delegation had only the intention to guarantee that Germany
could maintain its integration requirement after admission, but it was
aware of the intention of the Dutch delegation to apply an integration test
abroad. After adoption of the directive, the Dutch civil servants actively
approached their German colleagues to promote the new Dutch legislation
on integration requirements. Although this new requirement was just as
28 ReferentenentwurfBMI, 3 January 2006, www.fluechtlingsrat-nrw.de/2256.
29 Hillgruber, Mindestalter und sprachliche Integrationsvorieistung-verfassungsge-
mafie Voraussetzungen des Ehegattennachzugs?, ZAR 2006, 304-317; Kingreen,
Verfassungsfragen des Ehegatten- und Familiennachzugs im Aufenthaltsrecht,
ZAR 2007, 13-20. See also Block, Policy Frames on Spousal Migration in Ger-
many: Regulating Membership, Regulating the Family, Heidelberg 2016, for an
analysis of the political debate on family reunification in Gennany.
30 § 30 lit2 AufenthG., Hwweise H IV, 1, paragraph 197 en 199.
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sensitive and contested as the age-limit, the two coalition parties agreed to
introduce the language requirement in their implementation legislation.
According to respondents, the SPD decided to accept he test in exchange
for the Bleiberechtsregelung, with the idea that courts would probably
held the language requirement to be unconstitutional. In the third part of
this article, we will take the language or integration test abroad as a case
study for a more in-depth analysis of the mutual influence in family reuni-
fication policies.
3. Time limit for refugees
The directive leaves Member States the option of introducing a three-
month time limit for refugees to apply for family reunification after the
granting of refugee status.31 If this time limit is exceeded. Member States
are allowed to require that the refugee fulfills the income and housing re-
quirements of Article 7(1) of the directive. This time limit had been suc-
cessfully advocated by the Dutch government. Although the Netherlands
was the only Member State applying such a time limit in their national
law, the proposal was accepted by the Council.32
At the time the directive was adopted, the German legislation had only
recently, with the adoption of the Zuwanderungsgesetz, introduced the
possibility for family reunification to refugees and subsidiary protected
persons. Since then their family members were entitled to an Aufenthalts-
erlaubnis. The new law granted the right o family reunification to both
holders of a permanent residence permit and migrants who hold a tempo-
rary status if there is a prospect of one more year legal residence.33 Previ-
ously, immigration authorities had discretion to waive the requirements on
income and accommodation if refugees or subsidiary protected persons
applied for family reunification. Since the directive became binding, they
are obliged do to so.34 Thus, the directive has strengthened the right to
31 Article 12(1) FRD.
32 In the meantime, fifteen EU Member States have applied the time-limit of three
months, see the synthesis report "Family reunification for third country nationals
in the EU Member States and Norway: national practices", EMN, April 2017,
paragraph 4.5.
33 § 30 I 3e) AufenthG.
34 Richtlinienumsetzungsgesetz, Artikel 1, nr. 21: § 29(2)(2) AufenthG.
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family reunification for refugees, but at the same time, the German gov-
emment restricted it by adopting the time limit of three months, intro-
duced at Dutch insistence in the directive.
During the preparation of the bill implementing directive 2003/86 and
other directives, German officials were concerned about the feasibility of
lodging the application in time and discussed the consequences ofexceed-
ing the time limit. However, granting the sponsor the possibility to submit
the application was considered a sufficient guarantee, and the legislation
does not provide for a hardship clause. From the Dutch practise, it appears
that the time limit is exceeded in a limited number of cases, even if the
sponsor is allowed to submit he application. Failures are often related to
insufficient or incorrect advice of volunteers or professionals assisting
refugees, combined with the refugee's limited knowledge of the Dutch
language. In 2016, a case about exceeding the application time limit was
discussed before the highest Dutch administrative court in the light of the
Family Reunification Directive. The Council of State decided to submit a
question to the Court of Justice on the need for an individual assessment
within the framework of the Directive and Union law if the time limit of
Article 12 is exceeded.35 The answer of the Court will also be relevant for
Germany, as the German authorities apply the time limit strictly, just like
their Dutch colleagues. Until now, the Dutch government had refused to
follow the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Migration Af-
fairs to include a hardship clause in the legislation.36 Considering its case
law, the Court of Justice will probably repeat hat Member States have to
make an individual assessment of the concrete circumstances and interests
(in the light of the Articles 7 and 24 of the EU Charter and the Union law
principle of proportionality) in case the three-months requirement is ex-
ceeded with a few days or weeks.
In response to many complaints by the Refugee Council and lawyers
about the disproportional harsh effects of a refusal in case of exceeding
the time limit, the Dutch Secretary of State has proposed to prolong the
legal time-limit o six months.37 Although this new time limit may still
lead to disproportional effects, it will offer more protection to the family
unity. However, the initial Dutch three-months time limit maintains to be
35 ABRvS 21 June 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:1609,
36 "Na de vlucht herenigd", ACVZ, Den Haag, October 2014.
37 See the legislative proposal submitted to the Parliament at 19 September 2016,
Kamerstukken II, 2016-2017. 34 544.
368
Family Reunification i  Germany, Netherlands and the EU since 2000
applied in fourteen other Member States, including Germany, as a 'trans-
position' of the directive.
IV. Case Study: language or integration test abroad
Germany and the Netherlands were the first EU Member States requiring
the passing of a language test as a condition for admission of family mem-
bers. The Netherlands introduced a language and knowledge test abroad in
2006 and Gennany introduced the German language test abroad in 2007.
Austria and the UK are the only other Member States actually applying a
language test as a condition for admission. In Denmark and France there
was political pressure to follow the 'Dutch model', but for different rea-
sons (costs in Denmark and the constitutional right to family life in
France) that model was not adopted in the end.38
1. The German model pushed in the Netherlands
Germany made passing a Gennan language test a precondition for the ad-
mission of Aussiedler in 1997 as part of a general policy to reduce the
number of Aussiedler families admitted in Gennany. According to the
Sussmuth Kommission the test had "an important filtering effect,"39 re-
suiting in a 67 percent drop decrease of ethnic Germans coming to Ger-
many within the first year. In 2000, fewer than half of the applicants for
38 Groenendijk, Pre-departure Integration Strategies in the Eiu-opean Union: Integra-
tion or Immigration Policies? European Journal of Migration and Law (13) 2011,
p. 1-30; Strik/Bocker/Luiten/van Oers, The Intec project; Integration and Naturali-
sation tests: the new way to European Citizenship, a comparative r search on the
effects of integration and naturalization tests in nine Member States", synthesis re-
port of 2010, in Pascouau/Strik (cds), 'Which Integration for Migrants? The rela-
tion between the EU and its Member States', Nijmegen 2010. For an overview of
the national policies and their impact see Strik, Integration tests: helping or hinder-
ing integration? 2013; Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, report doc. no.
13361.
39 Sussmuth Kommission (Unabhangige Kommission Zuwandenmg - Independent
Commission on Immigration), Zuwandemng estalten, Integration Fordem,
Berlin, July 4, 2001.
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the status of ethnic German passed the language test.40 In 2005, the lan-
guage test requirement was extended to the non-German family members
ofAussiedler.
In the Netherlands CDA politicians ince 2000 argued for the introduc-
tion of language test abroad as way of starting the integration process al-
ready before entry.41 Dutch CDA politicians may well have heard from
their CDU colleagues about the experiences with the German language
test abroad at their regular meetings or during meetings on immigration
policy.42 In 2002, the CDA mentioned this issue explicitly in its electoral
programme. The issue was not mentioned in the coalition agreement of the
short-lived CDA-VVD-LPF government. However, the Immigration Mini-
ster of the populist LPF party, the foremnner of the Party of Geert
Wilders, supported this idea and under his responsibility, Dutch officials
introduced the issue in Bmssels.
2. Negotiations in Bmssels
In October 2002, during the late stages of the negotiations on the Family
Reunification Directive, the Netherlands obtained support from Germany
and Austria for an amendment o replace the non-discrimination clause in
Article 7(2) of the proposal by a clause allowing Member States to require
third-counfay family members to comply with integration measures in ac-
cordance with national aw.43 The Dutch government intended to oblige
newcomers to follow integration tests before being allowed entry in the
Netherlands. The Gennan government at that time was only considering
the introduction of the obligation for family members to attend German
language courses after admission.44 In the Council Working Group the
amendment met with opposition from Belgium, France and Sweden. In
December 2002, a motion by a CDA MP in favour of a pre-admission in-
40 Michalowski, Integration Tests in Germany: A Communitarian Approach? in: van
Oers/Ersboll/Kostakopoulou, A Re-definition of Belonging? Language and Inte-
gration Tests in Europe, Leiden/Boston 2010, p. 1185-210.
41 Bonjour, Grens en gezin, Beleidsvonning inzake gezinshereniging m Nederland
1955-2005, Amsterdam 2009, p. 262-263.
42 See e.g. NRC 7 June 2002.
43 Council document 13053/02 of 23 October 2001, p. 12.
44 Strik, Besluitvorming over asiel- en migratierichtlijnen. De wisselwerking tussen
nationaal en Europees niveau, p. 108-110.
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tegration test for family migrants was adopted in the Second Chamber of
the Dutch Parliament with the support of all major political parties. The
Dutch delegation used this motion as an argument in the negotiations in
Bmssels. In the final phase of the negotiations at the beginning of 2003,
the opposition of other member states was overcome. A sentence was
added stipulating that integration measures could only be applied to the
family members of refugees after they had been granted family reunifica-
tion. This sentence later provided the basis for the argument hat other
family members could be required to comply with integration measures
before admission.
3. National egislation implementing the Family Reunification Directive
Only after the Netherlands had succeeded in getting the integration mea-
sures included in Article 7(2) of the directive, the issue was explicitly
mentioned in the coalition agreement of the new centre-right government
of May 2003.45 The room for pre-entry tests had been created in Bmssels,
but realising this idea at home was another matter. After the adoption of
the directive, it took several years to overcome the opposition against he
introduction of the pre-entry tests. In 2005, the Dutch Minister for Immi-
gration Verdonk visited the European Commission for a consultation on
the compatibility of the bill introducing the integration exam abroad. The
Commission in reply wrote to the minister that there was generally no
problem of compatibility with Directive 2003/86 if in the application of
Article 7(2) the proportionality principle and human rights would be re-
spected. However, the Commission held that the new requirement could
raise legal problems when applied to third-country national family mem-
bers reuniting with nationals of other Member States resident in the
Netherland and to Turkish nationals considering the standstill clauses in
the EEC-Turkey association law. The Commission stressed that the Court
of Justice would have the last word.46 In the Netherlands the integration
test abroad after a lot of opposition both in parliament, from NGOs and
within the Ministry of Justice was introduced in 2006. During the debate
45 Kamerstukken II, 2002-2003, 28637, n. 19, p. 14.
46 Letter of the European Commission of 14 June 2005 to the Dutch minister, for-
warded to both chambers of the Dutch Parliament by the minister, Kamerstukken
//. 2004-2005. 29700. no. 8 and Kamerstukken I, 2004-2005, 29700, no. E.
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in the Senate the social-democratic party PvdA referred to the German
language test abroad for Aussiedler applying for admission on the basis of
their German ethnic origin, hence serving a different aim than admission
for family reunification. In Germany, the language test abroad was intro-
duced in 2007 as part of the legislation implementing a series of EU mi-
gration and asylum directives. In those years the Dutch government re-
peatedly countered critical parliamentary questions about the integration
test abroad by stating that other Member States, such as Denmark, Ger-
many and France were following the 'Dutch model' or considering to do
so.47
In 2008, the issue of raising the level of the Dutch integration test
abroad from A 1 minus to Al was discussed in the Second Chamber of the
Dutch Parliament. The responsible PvdA Minister in order to overcome
opposition declared that she would explore the possibilities of involving
the Goethe Institutes in offering Dutch language courses.48 The Dutch
government did and still today does not offer Dutch language courses for
prospective immigrants abroad. Apparently, these explorations were not
successful. The idea died a silent death.
4. Influence through national courts and the EU Court of Justice (Imran
case triggering the debate)
The first reference to the EU Court of Justice on the compatibility of the
Dutch integration test abroad was made by the Aliens Chamber of the Dis-
trict Court in Zwolle in 2011 in the Imran case.49 The case concerned a
failed Afghan asylum seeker who, after many years of tolerated stay in the
Netherlands, during the 2007 regularization campaign received a residence
permit. After he managed to meet he income requirement (120 percent of
the national minimum wage at that ime) by working in two jobs, he asked
for reunification with his wife and seven minor children who were living
47 Kamerstukken II, 2007-2008, 31 268, nos. 1-2, p. 131 and reply to written ques-
tions Kamerstukken II, 2007-2008, no. 2687 of 18 June 2008; See also Aanh.
Hand. EK 2007-2008 no. 13 with written questions of 10 July 2008, replies re-
ceived at 5 September 2008.
48 Handelingen II, 1 February 2008,p. 51-3726.
49 Rb Zwolle 31 maart 2011, AWB 10/9716, ^ 2017/30, migratieweb vel1000798,
annotation A.B. Terlouw.
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in Pakistan. At the Dutch embassy in New Delhi the children received a
visa, but the mother was refused a visa because she had not passed the in-
tegration test abroad. On the detailed proposal of her lawyer in the appeal
procedure, the District Court referred a series of questions on the compati-
bility of the refusal on this ground with Directive 2003/86 and with Arti-
cles 21 and 24 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to the Court of
Justice. The District Court also asked the CJEU to deal with this case in
the urgent procedure (PPU). The CJEU granted that request, which nor-
mally would have resulted in a judgment from the CJEU within three
months. The European Commission in its written observations in this case
concluded that a refusal of family reunification based solely on the ground
that the spouse did not pass the integration test abroad, is non compatible
with Article 7(2) of Directive 2003/86. After the Agent of the Dutch gov-
emment convinced the Minister of Justice of the serous risk that the Court
of Justice would come to a similar conclusion, the Afghan mother was
granted a visa within a week after the Commission filed its conclusion.
The Court of Justice then decided that there was no longer a need to an-
swer the preliminary questions.50 The statement by the European Commis-
sion in this case had effects both in the Netheriand and in Germany
5. Effects of the Commission's position in Imran in Gennany
In Germany, the written observations were translated in German and re-
suited within a month in parliamentary questions by a Member of the Bun-
destag about the compatibility of the German language test abroad with
the directive. The German government in its answer eferred to the judg-
ment of the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwG) of 30 March 2010. In
that judgment, the BVerwG held the German language test abroad to be
compatible with the directive, three weeks after the CJEU judgment in
Chakroun, the first reference concerning the directive. However, the
BVerwG did not mention that important CJEU judgment. The German
government in its answer stated that it agreed with the judgment of the
BVerwG (,,Die Bundesregierung teilt die in diesem Urteil zum Ausdmck
kommende Rechtsauffassung des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts."), also
50 CJEU, C-155/11PPU (Imran), ECLI:EU:C:2011:387.
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without mentioning the Chakroun judgment of CJEU. 51 However, a few
months later the BVerwG, after having read the observations of the Euro-
pean Commission, held that he issue of the compatibility of the language
test abroad with Article 7(2) of Directive 20003/86 should be referred to
the Court of Justice.52 The BVerwG could not make the reference itself in
that case, because the Auswartige Amt had granted the visa for the family
member while the case was pending before the BVerwG. Thus, the court
made its new position known in the decision on the costs in that case.
The hint of the BVerwG was understood by the Verwaltungsgericht
Berlin, the only first instance court dealing with appeals in cases concem-
ing visa in Germany. That court made three subsequent references to the
CJEU on the compatibility with the standstill clause in the EEC-Turkey
association law and with Article 7(2) of the directive. The first reference
in October 2012 in the Ayalti case was withdrawn after a few months be-
cause the visa had been granted in the meantime.53 In the second refer-
ence, made in Febmary 2013 in the Dogan case, resulted in a judgment by
the Court of Justice in 2014. The Court held the language test o be incom-
patible with the standstill clause in Article 41 of the Additional Protocol to
the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement, but did not answer the sub-
sidiary question about the compatibility with Directive 2003/86.54 In the
third case, referred to Luxemburg three months after the Dogan judgment,
the Berlin court repeated its question on Article 7(2). However, that refer-
ence in the Omche case was withdraw upon suggestion by the CJEU's
Registrar, after the judgment of the CJEU in the K&A case on the Dutch
integration test abroad.55
Summaries of all three relevant judgments of the BVerwG on the Ger-
man language test abroad were published in Dutch translation on Mi-
gratieweb, the specialized website for Dutch immigration lawyers.56 The
three references by the Verwaltungsgericht Berlin were made accessible in
Dutch in the same way, using the translation provided by the Court ofJus-
51 Questions by Mehmet Kilic (Greens), BT-Drs. 17/6712, nos. 1 1 and 12.
52 BVerwG 28 October 2011. lC9.10.NVwZ2012.61.
53 CJEU, C-513/12 (Decision Pres), ECLI:EU:C:2013:210.
54 CJEU, C-138/13 (Dogan), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2066.
55 CJEU, C-527/14, (Decision Pres), ECLI:EU:C:2015:599.
56 BVerwG 30 March 2010, 1 C 8.09, in the Netherlands: Migratieweb vel 1000600,
BVerwG 28 October 2011, 1 C 9.10, in the Netherlands: Migratieweb ve
11002774 and BVerwG 4 September 2012, 10 C 12.12, in the Netherlands: Mi-
gratiewebve 12001866.
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tice on its website. These Gennan judgments had relatively little effect in
the Netherlands, due to a judgment of the highest Dutch court in social se-
curity matters. That court (Centrale Raad van Beroep) in 2011 held the
obligation to pass the Dutch integration test after admission to be incom-
patible with the standstill clause and with the prohibition of discrimination
on the ground of nationality in the EEC-Turkey association law.57 Accord-
ing to the Dutch Aliens Act, Turkish nationals after that judgment automa-
tically were exempt from the Dutch integration exam abroad as well.
6. Effects of the Commission's position in Imran in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands the position of the European Commission had clear ef-
fects in the case law. One of the District Courts explicitly held that it
agreed with the opinion of the Commission on the incompatibility of the
Dutch integration test abroad with Article 7(2) of the directive.58 In the ap-
peal filed by the government, he highest administrative court which in an
earlier case summarily held that refusal of reunification for not having
passed the exam was compatible with Article 5(5) of the Directive59, now
had the choice between three options: also adopt he position expressed by
the Commission, provide serious arguments why it did not agree with that
opinion or make a reference to the EU Court of Justice. The court chose
the last option, using as one its arguments that he Court of Justice in its
Dogan judgment did not answer the question of the Verwaltungsgericht
Berlin on Article 7(2) of Directive 2003/86.60 This became the case K&A
in Luxemburg. The CJEU judgment in K&A in the Netherlands resulted in
a reduction of the costs of the integration exam abroad and in a reformula-
tion and a clearly more serious and individual application of the hardship
clause.61 Other elements of the K&A judgment, such as the warning by the
Court that the exam should not function as a selection mechanism, were
taken less serious by the Dutch authorities. More than half of the appli-
57 CRvB 16August2011,ECLI:NL:CRVB:2011:BR4959.
58 Aliens Chamber District Court Den Bosch 23 November 2012, ECLI:NL:RSB-
GR:2012:BY4171.
59 ABRvS 9 Febmary 2009, ECLI:NL:RVS:2009:BH5761.
60 ABRvS 1 April 2014, ECLI:NL:RVS:2014:1196.
61 Letter of Minister of Social Affairs of 17 December 2015 to the Second Chamber,
TK 32005,no. 8.
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cants from certain countries of origin fail the test. After the testing method
had been changed in 2015, the average pass rate has gone down from 66%
to 57% for applicants who took the exam for the first time. For several na-
tionalities, the pass rate was between 20 and 40%.62
It is our impression that the effects of the K&A judgment in Germany
so far are minimal, but still a point of dispute.63 The Integrationsbeauf-
tragte of the Federal Government in her report of December 2016 explicit-
ly stated that the legislation on the German language test abroad in force
since 2007 is incompatible with Union law. ("Die Entscheidung zeigt aber
auch, dass die seit 2007 geltende deutsche gesetzliche Regelung zum
Spracherfordemis (§ 30 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 2 AufenthG) ohne Hartefallrege-
lung unvereinbar mit EU-Recht war."64). This opinion was shared by the
administrative appeals court competent o deal with visa cases and it was
subject of an infringement procedure of the European Commission.
7. Infringement procedures tarted by the European Commission
The Commission started three times a formal infringement procedure
against Germany concerning the incorrect implementation of Directive
2003/86. In the first procedure in 2005, the Commission acted against the
non-implementation of the directive. This case came before the Court of
Justice in 2007, but was withdrawn by the Commission after the adoption
of the Act implementing a series ofEU migration and asylum instruments
in the Aufenthaltsgesetz in that year.65 The Commission started the second
infringement procedure in 2013, when an informal Pilot begun in July
2012 with two series of questions on the actual application of Article 7(2)
of the Directive in German legislation and practice did not result in satis-
factory answers by the German government. This case was closed after
62 Monitor basisexamen inburgering buitenland 2015-1, Ministry of Social Affairs,
November 2015.
63 See answers to parliamentary questions ofUlla Jelpke (Linke), BT 18/9651 of 16
September 2016 and of Sevim Dagdelen (Linke), BT-Drs. 18/10596, nr. 14 re-
garding a.o. the actual application of the hardship-clause and the costs of the
courses.
64 BT-Drs. 18/10610, p. 282-284.
65 Infringement case 20050924 before the CJEU as case C-192/07, deleted from the
Court's register by order of the President of the CJEU of 24 January 2008.
ECLI:EU:C:2008:43. ' -- " -' '""""'' ""'"'
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two and a half years of correspondence and negotiations between the
Commission and the German government.66 The third case on the imple-
mentation of the Dogan judgment in Germany was started by the Com-
mission again with an informal Pilot shortly after that CJEU judgement in
2014. When the reactions of the German government, that after several
months it was still studying the meaning of the judgment, proved unsatis-
factory, the Commission started a formal infringement procedure in 2015,
considering that Union requires the hardship clause not be in internal in-
stmctions ("Eriass") but in regular legislation.67 This view was shared by
the Administrative Appeal Court Berlin-Brandenburg early in 2015.68 In
August 2015 a new hardship clause was introduced in the relevant legis-
lative provision, §30 I 3, 6 AufenthG, without any mention either of the
CJEU case law nor of the infringement procedure. The Integrationsbeauf-
tragte considered that his new clause did not meet he standards required
by the K&A judgment.69 However, the Commission was satisfied and
closed this infringement procedure in April 2017.
Against he Netherlands, the Commission started one formal infringe-
ment procedure on the untimely communication f the implementation f
the Directive 2003/86 and several informal pilot procedures. The public
debate on the implementation f the directive in the Netherlands was stim-
ulated by the 2008 Commission's report on the implementation f the di-
rective in Member States. In that report he Commission specified a series
of conditions for integration measures before admission to be compatible
with the directive. The Netherlands was not explicitly mentioned, but it
was clear that his part of the report aimed at one or two Member States in
particular, i.e. Gennany and the Netherlands.70 The Commission's report
gave rise to several series of critical parliamentary questions by Dutch
MPs.71 The Commission started its first Pilot regarding the Netherlands in
November 2012 after the Dutch Refugee Council and the national organi-
sation of Turkish immigrants IOT had filed complaints about the imple-
66 Infringement case 20132009 closed on 19 November 2015.
67 Infringement case 20154005, see Kleine Anfrage Ulla Jelpke (Linke) BT-Drs.
18/9651, no. 16 of 16 September 2016.
68 OVG Berlin-Brandenburg, ZAR 2015, 234.
69 See Report of December 2016, p. 283.
70 COM(2008) 610 of 8 October 2008, par. 4.3.4.
71 See e.g. the question by Tineke Strik (Green Party), Aanh. Hand. EK 2008-2009,
nos, 1-2, written questions of 10 October, replies received at 4 December 2008.
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mentation of the Directive in the Netherlands.72 This Pilot concerned not
only the Dutch integration tests abroad and its effect for illiterate family
members, but also a range of other implementation issues considered
problematic by the Commission, such as the high fees, the family reunifi-
cation of refugees, the treatment of children during the interview after the
visa applications and late applications. On several of these issues the mles
or the practice in the Netherlands have been improved in recent years
without any reference being made to the pressure exerted by the Commis-
sion. The Commission's pressure often coincided with pressure and ac-
tions by national institutions, such as the National Ombudsman, national
courts and individual MPs. In 2015 the Commission asked the Dutch gov-
emment how it had implemented the CJEU judgment in the K&A case on
the integration test abroad.
There is no explicit relationship between the infringement procedures
against the two Member States that first introduced the integration/
language test abroad. But there is an apparent implicit relationship. The
Commission used the experience acquired in the discussions with one
Member State in its discussions with the other Member State. Some of the
questions in the 2012 Pilot regarding the German language test abroad
were based on experience with the Dutch integration test abroad. On the
other hand, the position of the Commission on which integration measures
abroad are compatible with Article 7(2) changed from a liberal stance in
the Imran case in 2012, towards a more restrictive position in the Dogan
case in 2014 and the K&A case in 2015, probably partly as a result of the
changing political climate and partly of pressure from both Member States
concerned.
8. Little Gennan support for Dutch efforts to amend Directive 2003/86
and Directive 2004/3 8
In the coalition agreement of the right-wing minority government ofVVD
and CDA in power between 2010 and 2012, which depended on the votes
ofGeert Wilders Party, the three parties announced to make the family re-
unification policy stricter on 17 points. When it became clear that most of
72 The existence of this informal procedure became known through the answers to
parliamentary questions of Schouw (D66) in June 2013, see Aanh. Hand. TK
2002-2003, no. 2562, point 4.
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these changes would be incompatible with directive 2003/86, the govem-
ment decided to start a lobby for amending the directive. A position paper,
proposing ten amendments of the directive, was published73 and the Mini-
ster of Immigration visited several capitals of several Member States and
gave interviews in the national press.74 The minister eported positive re-
actions in Vienna and Prague but not in the capitals of major Member
States. The European Commission reacted to the Dutch pressure by pub-
lishing in 2011 a Green Paper on the right o family reunification ofthird-
country nationals living in the EU and started a public consultation by for-
mulating a series of questions to the Member States, NGOs and other
stakeholders.75 In their reactions several Member States stressed that inte-
gration was a national competence. Austria, Germany and a number of
German Lander pleaded for an amendment of the Directive to explicitly
allow for pre-entry measures, a desire that was fulfilled a few years later
by the Court of Justice in the K&A judgment. The Netherlands was the on-
ly Member State proposing to allow revocation of residence permits when
family members fail to meet integration conditions. Several Member
States expressed a preference for less restrictive or non-compulsory inte-
gration measures.76
The 2011 Dutch position paper also contained a proposal to amend Di-
rective 2004/38 of the free movement of Union citizens in order to delete
the right o family reunification with third-country family members of EU
nationals from that directive and instead apply Directive 2003/86 to those
family members. This proposal would have seriously reduced the right o
family reunification of EU nationals. Implicitly, this proposal would have
extended the possibility to require family members of nationals of other
Member States to pass a language or integration test before being allowed
to join their EU family member. That wish was expressed in political and
administrative circles in Berlin and The Hague years ago. However, the is-
73 Ministry of Interior, Position Paper - The Dutch standpoint on EU migration poli-
cy, The Hague 2011, p. 8.
74 See Minister Leers in an interview in the Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung of 5 Oc-
tober 2011: "Wir miissen die Sache europaisch angehen. Es gibt immer noch "Im-
portbraute" und auch Menschenschmuggel. Und es gibt noch viele Einwanderer
aus der zweiten und dritten Generation, die jetzt ins Heiratsalter kommen.".
75 COM(2011)735 of 15 November 2011.
76 European Commission, Summary of stakeholder esponses to the Green Paper on
the right to family reunification of third-country nationals, Bmssels 11 May 2012,
p. 11.
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sue was outside the scope of the Commission's Green Paper. The idea sur-
prisingly returned on the agenda during the negotiations between the
EU-27 and Cameron on the deal to prevent a Brexit concluded in the
European Council in Febmary 2016.77 But the protection of the right to
family reunification of EU nationals, resident in the UK after the Brexit
was firmly embedded in the preparatory documents of the Commission for
the negotiations that started in June 2017.78 The departure of the UK will
mean that a strong supporter for reducing the right to family reunification
of Union citizens will no longer be present in the Council and that the
Netherlands (and possibly Germany as well) will be more isolated in the
EU on this issue. The two countries raised the issue of integration of EU
nationals in the Council of Ministers in 2011 and organised a conference
on this issue in Rotterdam in 2012.79 Apparently, the two states did not re-
ceive much support for their views from other Member States so far.
V. Conclusion
The developments of national policies on family reunification clearly
show that the Europeanisation has opened up more avenues for mutual in-
fluence between governments. The adoption of a directive is one source of
convergence, but the many occasions for exchanges of information, expe-
riences and views inherent o the Europeanisation process is most likely as
important in bringing about convergence. The German and Dutch officials
and politicians used these venues for cooperation to gain support for their
policies and plans during the negotiations, and afterwards to learn about
new restrictions and how to seek the limits of the directive. The case study
on the language and integration requirement shows that this influence oc-
curs in a dynamic and reciprocal process, in which non-govemmental ac-
tors play a role as well. National courts, lawyers, NGOs and members of
parliament all influence the way their government applies the directive,
and they also learn from their colleagues in the neighbouring country or in
77 See Annex VII to European Council conclusions of 18 and 19 Febmary 2016, doc-
umentEUC01/16,p, 35,.
78 European Commission, Task Force for the Preparation and Conduct of the Negoti-
ations with the UK under Article 50 TEU, Working paper "Essential Principles on
Citizens' Rights", Doc. no. of 24 May 2017.
79 Council document 18296/11 of 12 December 2011.
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other Member States. Information about national policies, effects of pol-
icies, and case law in other Member States may serve as sources for advo-
cacy, arguments for national courts, for controlling the government or fil-
ing complaints at the European Commission. This internal pressure may
trigger EU Court of Justice judgments, and is needed afterwards to ensure
compliance with those judgments. Practice shows that full compliance
with the CJEU judgments does not occur automatically, especially if the
judgment concerns another Member State. So to ensure that the hanno-
nization process of family reunification policies evolves within the frame-
work of Union Law and the fundamental rights, sufficient checks and bal-
ances in that process are needed. This begs for more international channels
of exchange for national and European actors involved in the right o fam-
ily reunification. Furthermore, an intensified and interdisciplinary cooper-
ation between migration scholars from different Member States con-
tributes to comparative overviews, legal analyses and also information on
effects of certain national measures, which should be taken into account
while judging on their effectiveness. The "Hohenheimer Tage zum
Auslanderrecht" bring all these actors together and therefore offer a
unique venue for these exchanges and cooperation. We cannot under-
estimate how this contributes to the highly necessary checks and balances
in the interplay between the European and national evel. The network
Klaus has founded in this way is solid and promises to be ever growing.
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